github-pr-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull requests (comments, descriptions, and diffs). Malicious instructions embedded in these fields could influence the agent's behavior during automated tasks.
- Ingestion points: Processes PR content via
github-mcp-server-pull_request_readandlist_pull_requestsinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat the PR content as untrusted or to disregard embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
gh api graphqlfor repository mutations andgh pr createfor opening new pull requests. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the PR data is mentioned before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghCLI for various operations. - Evidence: It calls
gh api graphqlfor resolving review threads andgh pr createfor automating pull request creation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external GitHub repository for implementation patterns.
- Evidence: References the
github/awesome-copilotrepository inSKILL.md.
Audit Metadata