interrogate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted code diffs and file contents, which are interpolated into prompts for LLM sub-agents. This creates a surface where an attacker could attempt to embed instructions within the code to manipulate the reviewer agents. The skill mitigates this through specific instructions that constrain sub-agents to a read-only persona, though technical isolation of the input is limited.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted source code files and git diff outputs are gathered in
SKILL.md(Step 1) and passed to reviewers. - Boundary markers: The
reviewer-prompt.mdtemplate uses standard markdown headers to separate the code from instructions but does not implement specialized isolation or escaping for the untrusted content. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents are explicitly instructed to remain read-only, are forbidden from modifying files, and are barred from calling the
tasktool or spawning further agents. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform explicit sanitization or escaping of the input source code before it is interpolated into the prompt templates.
Audit Metadata