gangprompting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a pattern for indirect prompt injection by design. It ingests untrusted data from external chat platforms (Discord/Slack) and injects it into the agent's prompt context.
- Ingestion points: Messages are streamed into the session via the
Monitortool (Claude Code) oropencode-relay.ts(OpenCode). - Boundary markers:
opencode-relay.tsprefixes injected messages with a source label (e.g., "From Discord, channel [ID]:"). However, there are no instructions to the agent to treat this content as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The agent uses
discord-agent-bridge.tsto read, send, edit, and delete messages, in addition to its standard toolset. - Sanitization: External content is encapsulated in a JSON record before injection, but the text content of the messages is not sanitized or filtered for instructions.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]:
SETUP.mdand the header ofdiscord-agent-bridge.tssuggest running the bridge script directly from a remote URL using Deno. - Evidence:
deno run --allow-net --allow-env --allow-read https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dtinth/discord-message-proxy/main/tools/agent-bridge/discord-agent-bridge.ts. - Note: The remote resource is hosted on the author's own GitHub repository (dtinth), which aligns with the expected vendor infrastructure for this skill.
Audit Metadata