gangprompting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a pattern for indirect prompt injection by design. It ingests untrusted data from external chat platforms (Discord/Slack) and injects it into the agent's prompt context.
  • Ingestion points: Messages are streamed into the session via the Monitor tool (Claude Code) or opencode-relay.ts (OpenCode).
  • Boundary markers: opencode-relay.ts prefixes injected messages with a source label (e.g., "From Discord, channel [ID]:"). However, there are no instructions to the agent to treat this content as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses discord-agent-bridge.ts to read, send, edit, and delete messages, in addition to its standard toolset.
  • Sanitization: External content is encapsulated in a JSON record before injection, but the text content of the messages is not sanitized or filtered for instructions.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: SETUP.md and the header of discord-agent-bridge.ts suggest running the bridge script directly from a remote URL using Deno.
  • Evidence: deno run --allow-net --allow-env --allow-read https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dtinth/discord-message-proxy/main/tools/agent-bridge/discord-agent-bridge.ts.
  • Note: The remote resource is hosted on the author's own GitHub repository (dtinth), which aligns with the expected vendor infrastructure for this skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 19, 2026, 08:19 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gangprompting