magic-calendar
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to use the
shell_exectool to create project folders (e.g.,mkdir -p). While the examples show benign directory creation, the reliance on a general-purpose shell execution tool for folder management increases the risk of arbitrary command execution if the path arguments are influenced by malicious input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data from users—such as event titles, descriptions, and locations—and saves them into project files. This data is later retrieved and presented back to the agent via the
list_eventsaction. Maliciously crafted event details could contain instructions designed to hijack the agent's logic when the calendar is viewed or queried. - Ingestion points: User-provided parameters
title,description, andlocationin themanage_calendartool (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions within the stored event data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
shell_execfor directory creation and tool-mediated file writes for event storage. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation for the content of event fields.
Audit Metadata