commit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local scripts located at
.claude/scripts/lib/commit-review-policy.cjsand.claude/hooks/lib/review-receipt.cjs. These scripts are not part of the skill's distribution and reside in the project tree, which could lead to the execution of untrusted code if the project environment is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions explicitly state to 'never reconfirm commit/push'. By bypassing the human-in-the-loop confirmation typically required for git operations, the skill significantly increases its autonomy, allowing it to push changes to remote repositories without user review.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data (the code being committed).
- Ingestion points: Reads the content of pending commits and project configuration files.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish between code and agent instructions during the scan.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute Node.js scripts, perform git commits, and push to remote repositories.
- Sanitization: While the skill includes a safety check to scan for hardcoded secrets and
.envfiles, it does not include measures to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded within the code content itself.
Audit Metadata