start-workflow

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from local project files like workflows.json and files specified in preActions.readFiles. These files could theoretically contain malicious instructions if the repository itself is untrusted.
  • Ingestion points: Reads from workflows.json, preActions.readFiles, and preActions.injectContext (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Implements mandatory todo tracking for all steps and an explicit "workflow question" tool to obtain user approval before activating catalog-matched workflows.
  • Capability inventory: Can execute local Node.js scripts, perform file system writes in tmp/, and spawn sub-agents via the spawn_agent tool.
  • Sanitization: Workflow manifests are resolved through a dedicated JSON-aware script (read-workflow-entry.mjs) rather than direct file parsing, providing a layer of validation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Node.js scripts to manage workflow state and manifest resolution.
  • Evidence: Specifically calls node .claude/scripts/codex/read-workflow-entry.mjs, .claude/scripts/lib/workflow-manifest.cjs, and .claude/scripts/lib/workflow-baseline.cjs.
  • Context: These are project-internal utilities used for infrastructure management; they are executed with arguments passed as data rather than interpolated shell strings, reducing injection risk.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 08:16 PM