workflow-greenfield-init

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by design due to its orchestration of data-gathering and processing tasks.
  • Ingestion points: The workflow is initiated using the 'user's prompt as context' and explicitly calls the $web-research skill to perform deep-dive investigations into external, untrusted web sources.
  • Boundary markers: The skill body does not specify clear delimiters or instructions to ignore potential malicious content within the ingested research data or user prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including spawning sub-agents (spawn_agent), accessing internal configuration files (workflows.json, SKILL.md files), and executing infrastructure-modifying skills like $scaffold and $harness-setup.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of the external research data before it is passed to subsequent planning, architecture, and code-generation phases.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 08:16 PM