markdown-to-pdf

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file contains multiple directives aimed at overriding platform-level instructions and safety protocols. These include instructions to "Ignore Claude-specific mode-switch instructions" and the use of forceful language like "MANDATORY IMPORTANT MUST CRITICAL" to prevent the agent from deviating from the provided protocol.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/lib/chrome-finder.cjs executes shell commands using child_process.execSync to locate browser binaries (e.g., which google-chrome).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/lib/output-handler.cjs module performs file system modifications, including directory creation via fs.mkdirSync, based on user-controlled output paths.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references a setup process involving an install.sh script which is not included in the source files, making its behavior unverifiable. Furthermore, the skill is designed to download the Chromium browser (~150MB) if it is not found on the local system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill processes untrusted Markdown content and YAML frontmatter through the md-to-pdf and gray-matter libraries. This represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection or exploitation of parsing vulnerabilities (e.g., in the underlying js-yaml library used for frontmatter).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 14, 2026, 11:50 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — markdown-to-pdf