release-doc

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several library scripts interact with system tools to gather git and GitHub information.\n
  • Evidence: parse-commits.cjs, bump-version.cjs, and extract-pr-metadata.cjs use child_process.execSync to run git and gh commands.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses an external API to perform text transformations.\n
  • Evidence: lib/transform-llm.cjs makes network requests to Anthropic's official API (api.anthropic.com).\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from git logs and pull request summaries which serves as an attack surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: Reads git logs (git-log-*.txt), diffs, and pull request metadata from external repositories (specified in SKILL.md Step 0b and R1.1/R1.2).\n
  • Boundary markers: The workflow implements a 'Human Review Gate' and uses escapeMarkdown in render-template.cjs, though explicit delimiters for raw diff content are not strictly defined in instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files (reports), execute commands (git/gh), and access the network (Anthropic API).\n
  • Sanitization: Employs lib/utils.cjs::escapeMarkdown to sanitize commit descriptions before rendering into markdown.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: A utility script contains a potential command injection vulnerability if user-supplied arguments are not handled carefully.\n
  • Evidence: lib/bump-version.cjs builds a git command string using the --service argument (tagPattern) without sanitization before passing it to execSync.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 4, 2026, 10:12 AM