sync-codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator script
scripts/run-codex-sync.mjsusesnode:child_process.spawnto execute a sequence of 16 different scripts located in the.claude/directory. These scripts perform migrations, sync hooks, and run various verification tests. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that explicitly direct the agent to bypass user confirmation for certain actions. Specifically, the [WORKFLOW-EXECUTION-PROTOCOL] instructs the agent to 'AUTO-SELECT: Pick the best option yourself. Do not ask the user to choose', and the 'Subagent authorization' section states that invoking the skill 'authorizes use of the required spawn_agent subagent(s)'. These patterns are designed to increase agent autonomy and reduce user oversight. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mirrors instructional content from
CLAUDE.mdintoAGENTS.md. This creates a surface where malicious instructions in the source file could be propagated into the agent's primary context files. - Ingestion points:
CLAUDE.mdand various files underdocs/project-reference/are read during the sync process. - Boundary markers: The mirroring process from
CLAUDE.mdtoAGENTS.mddoes not appear to use sanitization or explicit 'ignore instructions' boundary markers for the copied content. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator has the capability to spawn subprocesses (
spawn) and write to the filesystem (stages 1-3). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or content validation is present for the data being mirrored.
Audit Metadata