cursor-agent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions for the Cursor CLI include fetching and executing a shell script directly from a remote URL (
https://cursor.com/install) via a pipe to bash. While this is a common installation pattern for this well-known service, it is a remote code execution vector. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill is to run the Cursor agent using terminal-based automation tools. This allows the agent to execute shell commands, manage git workflows, and interact with the filesystem.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, such as GitHub issues and project files (including
.cursor/rules,AGENTS.md, andmcp.json), which may contain malicious instructions. Since the skill has the capability to execute commands in a terminal session, this creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Reads GitHub issue details, project source code, and configuration files like
AGENTS.mdandmcp.json(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions for isolating untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Execution of arbitrary shell commands via the
cursor_agent_runtool and terminal sessions (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested data before it is processed by the AI agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The setup instructions include modifying user shell profiles (
~/.zshrcor~/.bashrc) to add new directories to the system PATH. While this is a standard persistence mechanism for CLI tool installation, it involves modifying sensitive configuration files.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cursor.com/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata