cursor-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions for the Cursor CLI include fetching and executing a shell script directly from a remote URL (https://cursor.com/install) via a pipe to bash. While this is a common installation pattern for this well-known service, it is a remote code execution vector.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill is to run the Cursor agent using terminal-based automation tools. This allows the agent to execute shell commands, manage git workflows, and interact with the filesystem.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, such as GitHub issues and project files (including .cursor/rules, AGENTS.md, and mcp.json), which may contain malicious instructions. Since the skill has the capability to execute commands in a terminal session, this creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Reads GitHub issue details, project source code, and configuration files like AGENTS.md and mcp.json (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions for isolating untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of arbitrary shell commands via the cursor_agent_run tool and terminal sessions (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested data before it is processed by the AI agent.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The setup instructions include modifying user shell profiles (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc) to add new directories to the system PATH. While this is a standard persistence mechanism for CLI tool installation, it involves modifying sensitive configuration files.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cursor.com/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 2, 2026, 10:32 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cursor-agent