command-code
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill mandates using the
--yoloflag (alias for--dangerously-skip-permissions) when running thecmdtool in headless mode. This bypasses all security permission prompts, allowing the sub-agent to execute arbitrary terminal commands and modify the filesystem without human review. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documented command pattern
cmd -p "<prompt>"does not include instructions for sanitizing the prompt content. If the string contains unescaped double quotes or other shell-sensitive characters, it could lead to command injection on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a sub-agent workflow that ingests untrusted data (e.g., from GitHub issues or local files) into the sub-agent's prompt. Without boundary markers or input sanitization, and given the sub-agent's elevated permissions (
--yolo), this creates a significant risk of indirect prompt injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents commands such as
cmd taste learnandcmd skillsfor downloading personalization data and extensions from GitHub repositories, which represents an external code ingress point.
Audit Metadata