command-code

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill mandates using the --yolo flag (alias for --dangerously-skip-permissions) when running the cmd tool in headless mode. This bypasses all security permission prompts, allowing the sub-agent to execute arbitrary terminal commands and modify the filesystem without human review.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documented command pattern cmd -p "<prompt>" does not include instructions for sanitizing the prompt content. If the string contains unescaped double quotes or other shell-sensitive characters, it could lead to command injection on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a sub-agent workflow that ingests untrusted data (e.g., from GitHub issues or local files) into the sub-agent's prompt. Without boundary markers or input sanitization, and given the sub-agent's elevated permissions (--yolo), this creates a significant risk of indirect prompt injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documents commands such as cmd taste learn and cmd skills for downloading personalization data and extensions from GitHub repositories, which represents an external code ingress point.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 01:37 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — command-code