subtitle-translate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/mux.shis vulnerable to injection. It interpolates shell variables directly into a Python command string that is subsequently executed viauv run. If a file path provided to the script (such as the source subtitle file) contains malicious characters like single quotes or Python metacharacters, it could lead to arbitrary code execution. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv run python -c "..."inscripts/mux.shto assemble and execute Python code at runtime. The use of string concatenation and shell variable interpolation to build executable logic is a risky pattern that enables command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted subtitle text from user-provided files and passes it to LLM agents for translation and review in
scripts/translate_workflow.js. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions hidden in the subtitles could attempt to influence agent behavior during the style-guide generation or translation phases. The skill lacks robust sanitization or strict delimiters for this external data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/argos_translate.pyscript performs runtime downloads of language translation models from the Argos Translate project. Additionally, the skill usesuv runandnix-shellto fetch dependencies like thesrtandargostranslatepackages from public registries at runtime.
Audit Metadata