stall-postmortem

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and path traversal due to how it handles log files.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses the $ARGUMENTS variable in SKILL.md to identify a log file or a CI run ID.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or warnings to treat the log content strictly as data, which could allow malicious content within the logs to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is tasked with reading files and potentially downloading artifacts from remote sources.
  • Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the path provided in $ARGUMENTS, which could allow a user to specify sensitive system files for the agent to analyze.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve downloading artifacts from external sources.
  • Evidence: The description in SKILL.md specifies that for CI run IDs, the localnet-logs artifact should be downloaded first from the continuous integration provider.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To perform the diagnosis, the agent must execute search and analysis commands on the provided logs.
  • Evidence: The skill defines a series of ordered checks, such as searching for specific error strings or log patterns, which requires executing file reading and pattern matching tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 09:26 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — stall-postmortem