stall-postmortem
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and path traversal due to how it handles log files.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses the
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdto identify a log file or a CI run ID. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or warnings to treat the log content strictly as data, which could allow malicious content within the logs to influence the agent's behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agent is tasked with reading files and potentially downloading artifacts from remote sources.
- Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the path provided in
$ARGUMENTS, which could allow a user to specify sensitive system files for the agent to analyze. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve downloading artifacts from external sources.
- Evidence: The description in
SKILL.mdspecifies that for CI run IDs, thelocalnet-logsartifact should be downloaded first from the continuous integration provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To perform the diagnosis, the agent must execute search and analysis commands on the provided logs.
- Evidence: The skill defines a series of ordered checks, such as searching for specific error strings or log patterns, which requires executing file reading and pattern matching tools.
Audit Metadata