implement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted external data, such as user-provided specifications, task descriptions, and bug reports, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(authorized behavior/requirements) andreferences/diagnose.md(bug reports and captured traces). - Boundary markers: The skill relies on natural language instructions to define 'authorized' work and requirements.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including writing code to the filesystem, executing shell commands for testing and typechecking (
SKILL.md), and running arbitrary scripts (curl, CLI, browser automation) for debugging (references/diagnose.md). - Sanitization:
references/diagnose.mdcontains a dedicated 'Redact' section instructing the agent to replace secrets with<REDACTED>and avoid including auth headers or credentials in its output. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function involves generating and executing various commands and scripts to verify code behavior.
- Evidence:
references/diagnose.mdencourages the creation of 'feedback loops' using curl scripts, CLI invocations, and headless browser scripts (Playwright/Puppeteer). - Context: These operations are fundamental to the skill's intended purpose of software implementation and debugging.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions acknowledge the risk of exposing sensitive data during the debugging process.
- Evidence:
references/diagnose.mdexplicitly warns that captured artifacts may carry authentication headers and that credentials should remain in environment variables rather than being displayed. - Mitigation: The inclusion of mandatory redaction steps for secrets and auth headers serves as a behavioral guardrail against accidental data exposure.
Audit Metadata