prompt-hermes-ai
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download the
@vibetechnologies/chrome-syncpackage from the npm registry usingnpxto facilitate browser session synchronization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instruction to use
npx -y @vibetechnologies/chrome-syncexecutes remote code from a third-party source not recognized as a trusted vendor, potentially allowing for the execution of unverified logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to execute various shell commands, including sourcing environment files (
source "$HOME/.hermes/.env"), setting restrictive file permissions (chmod 600), and running authentication checks with tools likegh auth statusandgit ls-remote. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive data, including API tokens, SSH keys, and browser session cookies. The use of
chrome-syncto push authentication cookies (e.g., for Google accounts) poses a data exposure risk, as it can grant the agent broad access to private services like email and storage if not strictly limited to dedicated profiles. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest instructions from messaging gateways (e.g., Telegram), creating an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted user input can influence sensitive agent actions.
- Ingestion points: External messaging gateways as described in the skill metadata.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses structured tags (e.g.,
<role>,<goal>,<inputs>) to define task boundaries and mitigate instruction overlap. - Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands, write persistent files to
~/.hermes/skills/, and manage system cron jobs. - Sanitization: The workflow includes mandatory read-back verification of written artifacts and state reporting (e.g., SHA-256 digests) to ensure configuration integrity.
Audit Metadata