peppol
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the Peppol network, including received invoices, credit notes, and inbound emails, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through commands such as
peppol inbox list,peppol mailbox get, andpeppol document get --fullas described inSKILL.mdand various reference files. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use specific delimiters or to disregard instructions embedded within the processed invoice data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform significant actions based on its analysis of this data, such as sending documents via
peppol document send, creating new documents, or managing attachments. - Sanitization: The skill documentation does not outline any procedures for sanitizing or validating the content of the external data before it is used to drive agent logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of the
peppolCLI tool to interact with the file system and remote APIs. - Evidence: The skill uses tools to download attachments to local paths (e.g.,
peppol document attachment get -o output.pdf) and create backups of all document data to specified directories (peppol backup <dir>). These operations are consistent with the primary purpose of the skill as a document management tool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for installing the
peppolCLI tool from external repositories. - Evidence: Installation instructions involve downloading code via Homebrew (
brew install e-invoice-be/tap/peppol-cli) and Go (go install github.com/e-invoice-be/peppol-cli/cmd/peppol@latest). These sources are associated with the official vendor of the skill.
Audit Metadata