4d-form-screenshot
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill passes raw user-provided input (form names or paths) directly into the --user-param command-line argument for the 4D runtime. This input is used by the internal 4D method to determine the target for the screenshot operation.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) due to the handling of untrusted user input in file system path construction.\n
- Ingestion points: User-supplied form identifiers passed as arguments in SKILL.md.\n
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to prevent the interpretation of malicious content within the form name strings.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill includes file system write capabilities via the setContent method in the 4D script and instructions to modify the application bundle resources (tool4d.app/Contents/Resources/).\n
- Sanitization: Although the assets/_formScreenshot.4dm script employs some path resolution logic and 'Try' blocks, it lacks comprehensive validation to sanitize the $formName variable against path traversal sequences (e.g., '../') when constructing the final output path.
Audit Metadata