st-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted input in the form of plan documents and code diffs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious code could influence the reviewer's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the content of Strikethroo plans and repository code diffs (generated via
git diff) as specified in theOperating ProcedureofSKILL.mdand implemented inscripts/code-review.cjs. - Boundary markers: The reviewer prompt constructed in
scripts/code-review.cjsuses<<<BEGIN CUMULATIVE DIFF>>>and<<<END CUMULATIVE DIFF>>>to delimit untrusted code changes. It also utilizes a randomly generateddeliveryTokenand specific delimiters to prevent the agent from spoofing the XML findings document. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (
git,xmllint) viaexecSync/spawnand dispatch complex prompts to other AI harnesses such asclaude,gemini, andcopilot. - Sanitization: Input data from the diff and plan is interpolated into prompts without extensive sanitization beyond basic character escaping and ANSI code removal.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically executes multiple external CLI tools to perform its core functions, including version control operations and AI harness orchestration.
- Evidence:
scripts/code-review.cjsuseschild_process.execSyncandspawnto rungit(for diffing and attribute checking),xmllint(for XML schema validation), and various AI harness adapters (claude,codex,cursor-agent,gemini,copilot,opencode). The command construction usesJSON.stringifyand argument arrays to mitigate basic command injection risks.
Audit Metadata