architecture-rendering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes user-supplied text messages and external images provided via the
image_urlsparameter in API requests (found in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to help the agent distinguish between its core instructions and potentially malicious commands embedded within the input data or images.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network operations by communicating with the EachLabs API endpoint (
eachsense-agent.core.eachlabs.run) to perform render generations. - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify any validation, filtering, or escaping mechanisms for the text descriptions or the content of the external images being processed.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and examples reference external network resources for API functionality and asset storage.
- The skill communicates with
eachsense-agent.core.eachlabs.runfor task execution and referencesstorage.eachlabs.aifor output retrieval. These domains are identified as official infrastructure belonging to the vendor 'eachlabs'. - One example references
example.comas a placeholder for architectural sketches.
Audit Metadata