architecture-rendering

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill processes user-supplied text messages and external images provided via the image_urls parameter in API requests (found in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to help the agent distinguish between its core instructions and potentially malicious commands embedded within the input data or images.
  • Capability inventory: The skill facilitates network operations by communicating with the EachLabs API endpoint (eachsense-agent.core.eachlabs.run) to perform render generations.
  • Sanitization: The documentation does not specify any validation, filtering, or escaping mechanisms for the text descriptions or the content of the external images being processed.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and examples reference external network resources for API functionality and asset storage.
  • The skill communicates with eachsense-agent.core.eachlabs.run for task execution and references storage.eachlabs.ai for output retrieval. These domains are identified as official infrastructure belonging to the vendor 'eachlabs'.
  • One example references example.com as a placeholder for architectural sketches.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 05:55 AM