eachlabs-fashion-ai
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of
curlcommands to interact with the EachLabs API atapi.eachlabs.aifor fashion-related AI tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data which is then processed by external AI models, creating a vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points: Text prompts, remote image/video URLs, and zip archive URLs specified in the model parameters in
SKILL.mdandreferences/MODELS.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat user-supplied prompts as potentially untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses network capabilities to send data to the
eachlabs.aiAPI and requests the API to fetch content from user-provided URLs. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the prompts or URLs before they are passed to the backend API.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
references/MODELS.mdfile defines adisable_safety_checkerparameter for several models. Notably, thebecome-imagemodel sets this totrueby default, which effectively disables the vendor's built-in content safety mechanisms for generated imagery.
Audit Metadata