robot-simulation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill contains setup instructions that pipe remote scripts directly into a shell or interpreter (e.g.,
curl -fsSL https://texttocad.dev/install.sh | shandirm https://www.texttocad.dev/install.ps1 | iex). This execution pattern is highly risky as it allows for the execution of unvetted code on the host machine. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary tool,
text-to-cad, dynamically downloads binary dependencies and environments (such as MuJoCo and CoACD) during runtime. This represents an unverifiable dependency risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a powerful CLI tool (
cad) that can execute Python scripts, perform file system operations, and manage network resources, providing a high-privilege environment that could be exploited. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core function is to process and review complex XML robot descriptions and CAD data formats. This creates a surface where maliciously crafted files could attempt to influence the agent's logic or exploit the underlying toolchain.
- Ingestion points: Robot description files (URDF, SRDF, MJCF) and CAD models (STEP, XBF) provided by the user or fetched from repositories.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to treat these file contents as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution, Python script execution, and network access for dependency retrieval.
- Sanitization: While validation commands like
cad urdf validateare present, they are focused on format correctness rather than security sanitization.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://texttocad.dev/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata