serverchan
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
bashandcurlto perform its primary function of sending HTTP POST requests to the ServerChan API. - Evidence: The
scripts/send.shscript and the instructions inSKILL.mdutilizecurl -sS -X POSTto transmit data toftqq.comandft07.comdomains. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a Python subprocess to ensure reliable and safe JSON construction for complex notification payloads.
- Evidence:
scripts/send.shuses a Python heredoc (`python3 - <<'PY'`) to process notification options and escape strings, avoiding common shell interpolation vulnerabilities.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted text (like deployment logs or task titles) to send as notifications.
- Ingestion points:
TITLEandDESParguments inscripts/send.sh. - Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to treat these as text content for a message.
- Capability inventory: Capabilities are limited to
curlnetwork requests to specific vendor domains. - Sanitization: Payloads are sanitized via
json.dumpsin the Python-based JSON assembler to prevent schema confusion. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages secrets safely by requiring the use of environment variables rather than hardcoded keys.
- Evidence: It utilizes
SERVERCHAN_SENDKEYand includes code to verify its presence without printing the value. The use ofcurl -sSprevents the key (which is part of the URL path in the ServerChan API) from being displayed in progress bars or verbose logs.
Recommendations
- CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata