skills/easychen/skills/serverchan/Gen Agent Trust Hub

serverchan

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses bash and curl to perform its primary function of sending HTTP POST requests to the ServerChan API.
  • Evidence: The scripts/send.sh script and the instructions in SKILL.md utilize curl -sS -X POST to transmit data to ftqq.com and ft07.com domains.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a Python subprocess to ensure reliable and safe JSON construction for complex notification payloads.
  • Evidence: scripts/send.sh uses a Python heredoc (`python3
  • <<'PY'`) to process notification options and escape strings, avoiding common shell interpolation vulnerabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted text (like deployment logs or task titles) to send as notifications.
  • Ingestion points: TITLE and DESP arguments in scripts/send.sh.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to treat these as text content for a message.
  • Capability inventory: Capabilities are limited to curl network requests to specific vendor domains.
  • Sanitization: Payloads are sanitized via json.dumps in the Python-based JSON assembler to prevent schema confusion.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages secrets safely by requiring the use of environment variables rather than hardcoded keys.
  • Evidence: It utilizes SERVERCHAN_SENDKEY and includes code to verify its presence without printing the value. The use of curl -sS prevents the key (which is part of the URL path in the ServerChan API) from being displayed in progress bars or verbose logs.
Recommendations
  • CRITICAL: 1 file(s) identified as malware by FileRep - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 10:22 AM