easyeda-api

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md include commands to start a background bridge server process using node ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/bridge-server.mjs &. This is a core component required to bridge the AI agent with the EasyEDA browser client.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides URLs to download a required browser extension (run-api-gateway.eext) from vendor-controlled domains jlcext.com and jlc-ext.com. These are legitimate resources for the EasyEDA ecosystem.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to read and process potentially complex electronic design files which may originate from untrusted third parties.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through numerous API calls documented in SKILL.md and references/, such as eda.dmt_Project.getCurrentProjectInfo(), eda.sch_PrimitiveText.get(), and eda.sys_FileManager.getDocumentSource().
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not currently require the agent to wrap design data in delimiters or use specific warnings when processing text from schematics or PCB layouts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including background process execution, local network communication, and filesystem access within the EDA client sandbox.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from the design files before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 08:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — easyeda-api