easyeda-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude commands to start a background bridge server process usingnode ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/bridge-server.mjs &. This is a core component required to bridge the AI agent with the EasyEDA browser client. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides URLs to download a required browser extension (
run-api-gateway.eext) from vendor-controlled domainsjlcext.comandjlc-ext.com. These are legitimate resources for the EasyEDA ecosystem. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to read and process potentially complex electronic design files which may originate from untrusted third parties.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through numerous API calls documented in
SKILL.mdandreferences/, such aseda.dmt_Project.getCurrentProjectInfo(),eda.sch_PrimitiveText.get(), andeda.sys_FileManager.getDocumentSource(). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not currently require the agent to wrap design data in delimiters or use specific warnings when processing text from schematics or PCB layouts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including background process execution, local network communication, and filesystem access within the EDA client sandbox.
- Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from the design files before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata