using-sprinty
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from external sources such as git repositories, task notes, and project artifacts, which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools described in
SKILL.mdsuch asnote_get,item_get,artifact_get,search,overview, andnext. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to treat data returned from these tools as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes tools for file modification (
artifact_add,artifact_update,note_add) and code execution (via 'executable gates' insprint_closeanditem_done), providing a significant impact surface for injection attacks. - Sanitization: There is no mention of escaping or sanitizing the content retrieved from these external sources before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of 'executable gates' and coverage commands that allow for runtime code execution. Tools like
item_addanditem_updateallow users to define executable gates, andsprint_closeanditem_doneexecute these gates to verify task status. Additionally, thesprint_closetool accepts acommandparameter within its coverage configuration to execute shell commands for generating coverage reports.
Audit Metadata