claude-verifier
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a specific template designed to trigger system prompt leakage in target AI models as a way to verify their authenticity.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, section 6 provides a payload that instructs the AI to 'paste the original text' (referring to the system prompt) before performing translation tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a Python script that processes data from remote API endpoints, creating a potential surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The
detect_modelfunction inSKILL.mdprocesses content from thetextfield of an external API's JSON response. - Boundary markers: The script does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the received data.
- Capability inventory: The script uses the
httpxlibrary for network communication andsysfor process control. - Sanitization: The external response is printed directly to the console using
print(f"\n๐ ๆจกๅๅ็ญ๏ผ{content[:500]}...")without escaping or validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple shell commands for the user to execute for testing and setup purposes.
- Evidence: The skill lists
curlcommands for API interaction andnpm/npxcommands for MCP tool configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to install external software to facilitate the verification process.
- Evidence: Section 5 in
SKILL.mdsuggests installing Playwright vianpm init playwright@latestand adding an MCP server usingnpx @playwright/mcp@latest.
Audit Metadata