pptx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py contains a hardcoded C source string that is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime using gcc. The resulting shared object is then used via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to intercept and modify system-level socket calls when executing LibreOffice (soffice). This is implemented as a workaround for environments with restricted UNIX socket permissions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the subprocess module to execute system binaries for document processing and environmental setup.
  • Runtime compilation of shims using gcc in scripts/office/soffice.py.
  • Document conversion and rendering using soffice and pdftoppm in scripts/thumbnail.py and scripts/office/soffice.py.
  • Version comparison of document XML using git diff in scripts/office/validators/redlining.py.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied PowerPoint files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Untrusted content from slides is rendered to images or extracted as text, which is then processed by the AI during analysis and visual QA tasks.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided .pptx files are ingested via scripts/thumbnail.py and scripts/office/unpack.py.
  • Boundary markers: The visual inspection prompts recommended in SKILL.md lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in slide images.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for rendering and conversion; file-system access for unpacking and repacking XML structures.
  • Sanitization: Use of defusedxml.minidom in validation scripts helps mitigate XML-specific vulnerabilities like XXE, but does not filter natural language instructions embedded in slide content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 16, 2026, 05:27 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pptx