pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string that is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime usinggcc. The resulting shared object is then used via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and modify system-level socket calls when executing LibreOffice (soffice). This is implemented as a workaround for environments with restricted UNIX socket permissions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
subprocessmodule to execute system binaries for document processing and environmental setup. - Runtime compilation of shims using
gccinscripts/office/soffice.py. - Document conversion and rendering using
sofficeandpdftoppminscripts/thumbnail.pyandscripts/office/soffice.py. - Version comparison of document XML using
git diffinscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied PowerPoint files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Untrusted content from slides is rendered to images or extracted as text, which is then processed by the AI during analysis and visual QA tasks.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
.pptxfiles are ingested viascripts/thumbnail.pyandscripts/office/unpack.py. - Boundary markers: The visual inspection prompts recommended in
SKILL.mdlack explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in slide images. - Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for rendering and conversion; file-system access for unpacking and repacking XML structures.
- Sanitization: Use of
defusedxml.minidomin validation scripts helps mitigate XML-specific vulnerabilities like XXE, but does not filter natural language instructions embedded in slide content.
Audit Metadata