echotik-api-assistant
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
nodeto execute local scripts for credential configuration (configure-echotik-auth.mjs) and API interaction (echotik-api.mjs). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
configure-echotik-auth.mjsscript modifies the user's shell configuration files (such as.bashrcor.zshrc) to persist theECHOTIK_USERNAMEandECHOTIK_PASSWORDenvironment variables across sessions. While transparently documented, this constitutes a persistence mechanism that modifies global system configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a documentation index from
https://opendocs.echotik.live/llms.txtto dynamically guide its behavior and parameter mapping for API calls. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the agent to interact with external image conversion endpoints and hosts (e.g.,
echosell-images.tos-ap-southeast-1.volces.com) to retrieve assets not directly accessible from the source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from TikTok (comments, video captions, product descriptions) retrieved via the EchoTik API, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: API responses processed by
echotik-api.mjscontaining creator profiles, video details, comments, and captions. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to wrap or delimit external data to prevent it from being interpreted as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform network operations via
echotik-api.mjsand modify system configuration files viaconfigure-echotik-auth.mjs. - Sanitization: Absent; the instructions do not specify any validation or filtering of content retrieved from the API before it is processed by the model.
Audit Metadata