keyapi-linkedin
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/configure-keyapi-auth.mjsis designed to modify the user's shell configuration files, including~/.bashrc,~/.zshrc,~/.profile, and Windows PowerShell profiles. This modification is used to persist theKEYAPI_TOKENenvironment variable across all future shell sessions, which serves as a persistence mechanism. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The authentication configuration script
scripts/configure-keyapi-auth.mjsaccepts theKEYAPI_TOKENthrough a command-line argument (--token). This practice is insecure as it can lead to the API token being stored in plain text within shell history logs (e.g.,.bash_historyor.zsh_history). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network requests to
api.keyapi.aianddocs.keyapi.aiusing thefetchAPI inscripts/keyapi-api.mjsandscripts/search-keyapi-docs.mjs. These requests transmit request parameters and Bearer tokens to the vendor's infrastructure. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the LinkedIn API (such as user posts, bios, and job descriptions) into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from LinkedIn via
scripts/keyapi-api.mjsand processed in the analytical workflows defined inreferences/linkedin-user-rules.mdand others. - Boundary markers: None identified; retrieved content is interpolated into analysis without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute local shell scripts, perform outbound network calls, and write files to the workspace.
- Sanitization: No escaping or instruction-filtering of the API response data is implemented before the agent processes it for reporting.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata