requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to facilitate the code review process.
- It executes
git rev-parseto retrieve commit identifiers (SHAs). - It executes
git diffandgit diff --statto analyze changes between commits. - These operations are limited to reading repository metadata and diffs, which is standard behavior for development-oriented tools.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from implementation summaries, requirements, and source code diffs.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via the
{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, andgit diffoutput parameters incode-reviewer.mdandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt template uses markdown headers to separate sections, though it lacks explicit instructions to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The subagents are granted the ability to read the git repository and suggest fixes. The
task-bug-fixeris intended to apply code changes. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of the input text is performed.
- Risk Assessment: The risk is low as the subagent's primary role is to critically analyze the code, and the skill includes specific constraints to prevent subagents from performing high-risk actions like spawning additional subagents.
- [SAFE]: Several security best practices are implemented within the skill instructions:
- Session Isolation: The skill supports a
SCRATCHPAD_DIRto ensure that parallel planning/execution sessions do not collide, preventing cross-session data leakage or corruption. - Recursion Prevention: The instructions explicitly forbid nested subagents (
Do not dispatch or invoke any subagents), which mitigates the risk of uncontrolled resource consumption or execution loops.
Audit Metadata