anime-cel
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses global JavaScript evaluation to process user-supplied coordinate expressions.
- Evidence: In
template/kit.js, thewindow.renderSheetfunction uses(0, eval)(v)to parse coordinate strings provided via the--crop-atcommand-line argument. This allows for arbitrary JavaScript execution within the headless browser context if an agent is tricked into passing malicious strings to the renderer. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on spawning external processes to perform its core tasks, which are sensitive operations.
template/render.mjsusesnode:child_process.spawnto executeffmpegfor video encoding and launches a headless Chrome instance viapuppeteer-core.scripts/new_project.shexecutes shell commands includingnpm install,rsync,cp, andsedfor project scaffolding and dependency management.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests to fetch external software and assets.
scripts/new_project.shperforms annpm install, downloading packages from the public NPM registry.template/studio.htmlloads external fonts from Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com) to render subtitles and UI elements.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for data-driven attacks.
- Ingestion points: The rendering engine processes command-line arguments in
template/render.mjsand reads configuration fromtemplate/src/config.jsand other project files. - Capability inventory: The skill has extensive file system access (reading and writing frames, project files), network access (via Puppeteer), and subprocess execution capabilities (ffmpeg).
- The combination of reading external project files and performing dynamic execution based on CLI input provides a vector for influencing the agent's actions or the rendering process if the input data is compromised.
Audit Metadata