blender-product-film
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runandsubprocess.Popento execute external binaries including Blender, FFmpeg, and Real-ESRGAN across multiple scripts (scripts/finish.py,scripts/prep_product.py,scripts/render_shots.py). These calls rely on environment variables and the system PATH to locate executables, which is a necessary part of the skill's media processing pipeline. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/pfilm.pyuses the__import__function to dynamically load themathutilsmodule for matrix operations within the Blender environment. This is a standard programmatic pattern for Blender-specific scripts but represents a dynamic module loading capability. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, including user-provided product photos and JSON shot specifications, which influence the rendering and editing logic.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/prep_product.pyaccepts a photo file path as a command-line argument;scripts/pfilm.py,scripts/render_shots.py, andscripts/finish.pyingest JSON configuration files for shot and edit sequences. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or explicit sanitization warnings for embedded instructions are present in the skill's documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess, perform file system writes for rendering frames, and load Python modules dynamically. - Sanitization: CLI arguments are handled via
argparseand data structures are parsed viajson.load, but the skill does not implement specific sanitization of image metadata or content validation for the JSON fields used to drive the rendering engine.
Audit Metadata