api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface exists through the ingestion of untrusted data from the Edge Impulse platform.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions involve fetching job logs from
/jobs/{jobId}/stdout/downloadand sample metadata or lists from the Studio API. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not define delimiters to separate agent system prompts from the content of fetched external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates shell command execution and network operations through the Edge Impulse CLI suite (e.g.,
edge-impulse-daemon,edge-impulse-uploader,edge-impulse-linux-runner). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill directs the agent to display error lines from downloaded job logs without explicit sanitization or filtering logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation facilitates the use of official Edge Impulse command-line utilities for platform automation and hardware interaction.
- Evidence: Documentation and recipes for
edge-impulse-daemon,edge-impulse-uploader,edge-impulse-run-impulse, andedge-impulse-linux-runner. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of platform tools and libraries from established package registries and official repositories.
- Evidence: Instructions for installing
edge-impulse-cliandedge-impulse-linuxvia npm, and references to official GitHub repositories within theedgeimpulseorganization.
Audit Metadata