build-custom-deployment-blocks

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided Python and Node.js templates use os.system and execSync to perform file operations and build steps. The code specifically uses shell interpolation (e.g., execSync(cp -r ${inputDir}/* ${buildDir})) which could be vulnerable to command injection if the metadata paths or CLI arguments contain malicious characters.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents a privileged: true flag that grants the deployment container internet access and injects the project API key. While a legitimate feature of the platform, it increases the risk of credential exposure if the build environment is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses instructions such as "Always read... Never hard-code..." to guide agent behavior. These are benign instructional markers for scaffolding but are monitored for safety.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill scaffolds a workflow where an agent processes untrusted external data (project models, SDKs, and metadata) from Edge Impulse Studio.
  • Ingestion points: Reads deployment-metadata.json and files from metadata.folders.input (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None; the scripts directly parse and interpolate metadata values into shell commands.
  • Capability inventory: Uses os.system, execSync, shutil, and fs for file system manipulation and command execution across the Python and Node.js templates (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The templates do not implement sanitization or validation for the values read from the metadata JSON before using them in shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 23, 2026, 01:13 AM