build-custom-deployment-blocks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided Python and Node.js templates use
os.systemandexecSyncto perform file operations and build steps. The code specifically uses shell interpolation (e.g.,execSync(cp -r ${inputDir}/* ${buildDir})) which could be vulnerable to command injection if the metadata paths or CLI arguments contain malicious characters. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documents a
privileged: trueflag that grants the deployment container internet access and injects the project API key. While a legitimate feature of the platform, it increases the risk of credential exposure if the build environment is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses instructions such as "Always read... Never hard-code..." to guide agent behavior. These are benign instructional markers for scaffolding but are monitored for safety.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill scaffolds a workflow where an agent processes untrusted external data (project models, SDKs, and metadata) from Edge Impulse Studio.
- Ingestion points: Reads
deployment-metadata.jsonand files frommetadata.folders.input(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; the scripts directly parse and interpolate metadata values into shell commands.
- Capability inventory: Uses
os.system,execSync,shutil, andfsfor file system manipulation and command execution across the Python and Node.js templates (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The templates do not implement sanitization or validation for the values read from the metadata JSON before using them in shell commands.
Audit Metadata