go-binary-size
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install a third-party binary from an external GitHub repository that is not associated with a verified organization.
- Evidence: The command
go install github.com/Zxilly/go-size-analyzer/cmd/gsa@latestinSKILL.mddownloads, compiles, and installs a tool from a third-party user account. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers downloads of external tools and references external container images.
- Evidence: Instructions for installing the
gsatool and references togcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonrootin the Dockerfile example. References to well-known registries likegcr.ioare generally safe, but the installation of unverified third-party tools is a concern. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and processes the content of various project files, creating a risk if those files contain malicious data designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdusesgrepto scan configuration files includingMakefile,Taskfile.y*ml,.goreleaser.y*ml,Dockerfile, and.github/workflows/. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to mitigate the risk of the agent obeying instructions embedded within the scanned files.
- Capability inventory: The skill is permitted to run
go,gsa,upx, andstripvia theBashtool, providing several paths for executing logic derived from file content. - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the data retrieved from project files before it is processed.
Audit Metadata