visual-verify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to render output and perform visual checks, including
bash,tinymist,pdftotext,screencapture, andnpx. Notably, it calls shell scripts located in parent and sibling directories (e.g.,../craft/scripts/goal-self-send.shand../../skills/look-at/scripts/look_at.sh), assuming a specific directory structure for its dependencies. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions provide a mechanism to spawn "general-purpose" subagents using the
Agent()function to perform visual scoring tasks when the primary vision tool is unavailable. Additionally, it dynamically generates temporary Typst source files (test-slide.typ) from templates to perform isolated rendering tests. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill constructs prompts for external vision models (Gemini, GPT-5.4, and Claude) by interpolating content from task specifications like
SPEC.mdorPLAN.md. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions inside those documents could potentially influence the reviewer model's output. - Ingestion points: Content from task specifications, project plans, and user requests is used to populate placeholders in vision goal templates.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers and specific structured formats (e.g., "## Check These Specifically") within its templates to separate context from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system writes (
cat), shell execution (tinymist,pdftotext), and subagent spawning. - Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of sanitization or escaping applied to the interpolated task data before it is sent to the vision models.
Audit Metadata