review-pr-check
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from GitHub PR comments and reviews via the
gh pr-review-checkCLI and thescripts/collect-review.shscript. - Ingestion points: Data enters the context from the output of GitHub CLI commands and REST/GraphQL API responses.
- Boundary markers: The protocol enforces structural parsing using
jqand maintains a clear separation between the classification (Phase 3) and execution (Phase 6) phases. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform
git push, issue GraphQL mutations viagh api, and execute local test suites likenpm testormake test. - Sanitization: The documentation recommends using structured file inputs for GraphQL mutation bodies to prevent command or string injection, and uses
jqto extract only specific validated fields from API responses. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution pipeline involves several shell commands including
git(pull, push, branch),gh(api, view, extension), and project-specific testing tools. These operations are essential to the skill's primary function of managing software review cycles and are triggered in a structured manner within the defined execution phases. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references the installation of the
gh-pr-review-checkextension from a public GitHub repository. This is an explicit, user-facing dependency required for the skill's orchestration logic and is not a silent or hidden download.
Audit Metadata