cco-export
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses user-supplied arguments directly within a shell command, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection or command injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdreceives input intended for the export format. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to sanitize or treat the arguments strictly as a format string.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute a Node.js process (node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/src/export.js $ARGUMENTS). - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization logic is present in the skill instructions to prevent shell metacharacter injection.
Audit Metadata