public-repo-explorer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze content from external, untrusted Git repositories, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The workflow involves cloning repositories from user-supplied URLs and reading various files, such as
README.mdand configuration files (documented inSKILL.md). - Capability inventory: The agent uses shell commands (
git,mkdir,rm) and internal file-reading tools to process the repo content. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from following instructions that might be embedded within the external repository's files.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the repository content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow relies on executing shell commands to manage the repository lifecycle on the host system.
- Evidence: The skill uses
mkdir -pto create workspaces,git clone --depth 1to fetch data, andrm -rfto clean up the temporary directory. These commands are necessary for the skill's primary purpose but involve direct interaction with the system shell using user-influenced parameters like repository URLs and names.
Audit Metadata