public-repo-explorer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze content from external, untrusted Git repositories, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The workflow involves cloning repositories from user-supplied URLs and reading various files, such as README.md and configuration files (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses shell commands (git, mkdir, rm) and internal file-reading tools to process the repo content.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from following instructions that might be embedded within the external repository's files.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the repository content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow relies on executing shell commands to manage the repository lifecycle on the host system.
  • Evidence: The skill uses mkdir -p to create workspaces, git clone --depth 1 to fetch data, and rm -rf to clean up the temporary directory. These commands are necessary for the skill's primary purpose but involve direct interaction with the system shell using user-influenced parameters like repository URLs and names.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 04:43 AM