pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and library injection detected in
scripts/office/soffice.py. - The script defines a C source string (
_SHIM_SOURCE) designed to shim UNIX socket calls. - It dynamically writes this source to a temporary file and invokes
gccto compile a shared object (.so) file. - It then uses the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this library into thesofficeprocess at runtime. - This mechanism is intended to allow LibreOffice to operate in environments where standard socket operations are restricted, which is essential for the skill's rendering functionality.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Surface area for untrusted data processing.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes
.pptxfiles provided as user input (e.g., inscripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/thumbnail.py). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potentially malicious text embedded within slide XML.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute arbitrary subprocesses (
soffice,pdftoppm,git,gcc) and perform extensive file system operations. - Sanitization: The skill utilizes
defusedxmlfor XML parsing, which provides strong protection against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, but does not sanitize the logical content of the slides. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on external binary execution.
- Commands like
soffice,pdftoppm, andgitare executed viasubprocess.runto handle file conversion, image generation, and version comparisons. This increases the risk if vulnerabilities exist in the underlying system tools when processing malformed binary inputs.
Audit Metadata