blender-pipeline-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/batch_process.pycontains a function_modulethat usesimportlibto dynamically load and execute Python modules from a file path provided via the--scriptCLI argument. - Evidence: The
_modulefunction usesimportlib.util.spec_from_file_locationandspec.loader.exec_moduleto load code from a path that is not statically defined. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes external files (e.g., .fbx, .blend) and can execute scripts on their data.
- Ingestion points: File and directory paths passed to the
--inargument inscripts/batch_process.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the script or instructions to warn the agent about embedded instructions in asset metadata.
- Capability inventory: File system access (read/write) and execution of Python code within the Blender environment.
- Sanitization: No content validation or sanitization of input file data is performed before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides instructions for CI/CD pipelines to download the official Blender Linux distribution from a well-known service. - Evidence: Reference to
https://download.blender.org/release/Blender5.2/blender-5.2.2-linux-x64.tar.xzin the CI recipe section.
Audit Metadata