blender-simulation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts external input (object names and simulation parameters) to configure the Blender scene, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/sim_setup.pyscript takes object names (--active,--passive,--cloth,--colliders) and key-value pairs (--set) via command-line arguments. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the agent from misinterpreting instructions embedded within these data strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify the Blender scene, configure modifiers, and save the main file (
bpy.ops.wm.save_as_mainfile) as evidenced inscripts/sim_setup.pyandscripts/_bpyx.py. - Sanitization: Basic type conversion for values is performed in the
_numhelper, and object names are validated againstbpy.data.objects, but property names and attributes are handled dynamically. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author name listed in the skill metadata and the provided author context.
- Evidence: The YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mdlists the author asblender-agent-skills, which does not match the provided author contextel4cteo. This constitutes misleading metadata, although no malicious instructions are present in the metadata fields.
Audit Metadata