blender-simulation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts external input (object names and simulation parameters) to configure the Blender scene, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/sim_setup.py script takes object names (--active, --passive, --cloth, --colliders) and key-value pairs (--set) via command-line arguments.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the agent from misinterpreting instructions embedded within these data strings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify the Blender scene, configure modifiers, and save the main file (bpy.ops.wm.save_as_mainfile) as evidenced in scripts/sim_setup.py and scripts/_bpyx.py.
  • Sanitization: Basic type conversion for values is performed in the _num helper, and object names are validated against bpy.data.objects, but property names and attributes are handled dynamically.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author name listed in the skill metadata and the provided author context.
  • Evidence: The YAML frontmatter in SKILL.md lists the author as blender-agent-skills, which does not match the provided author context el4cteo. This constitutes misleading metadata, although no malicious instructions are present in the metadata fields.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 09:51 PM