observability-sre-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external data, specifically log messages and trace attributes, which creates an inherent attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled into the agent context via ES|QL queries targeting
logs-*.otel-*andtraces-*.otel-*as documented inreferences/log-investigation.mdandreferences/apm-signals.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks) to separate log content from instructions, nor do they include explicit 'ignore instructions within data' directives.
- Capability inventory: The agent's capabilities are limited to executing read-only operations via the
elasticCLI (e.g.,esql query,slo find,ml get-jobs). It lacks dangerous capabilities like local file writing or arbitrary network requests. - Sanitization: Log content is processed as raw text for categorization and funneling without specialized sanitization against prompt injection payloads.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external CLI tool required for operation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdlinks to the official configuration for theelasticCLI atgithub.com/elastic/cli. As this is a repository managed by a well-known, trusted organization, the reference is considered safe and standard for the vendor's ecosystem.
Audit Metadata