docs-review-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from pull request diffs and metadata, which could contain malicious instructions from external contributors.
- Ingestion points: Pull request titles, bodies, and diff content are ingested via
gh pr viewandgh pr diffinSKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or markers to isolate untrusted pull request content when it is passed to sub-agents or processed by the primary agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(gh *),Bash(git *),Agent,Skill, andCallMcpTool, allowing for file system interaction, orchestration of other skills, and internal network requests via the MCP. - Sanitization: There are no specified procedures for sanitizing or escaping the data retrieved from pull requests before it is processed.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves documentation guidelines and pull request data from official and trusted sources.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdfetches information fromelastic.co,elastic.dev, andgithub.com. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses command-line tools to interact with the repository and verify the state of the working tree.
- Evidence: The skill executes
gh pr view,gh pr diff,git rev-parse, andgit fetchto resolve review targets and compare against base branches.
Audit Metadata