setup-agentic-scaffolding
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to download a shell script from
https://sh.jbang.devand execute it viabashas a fallback installation method. Although the skill mandates that the user review the file content before execution, this pattern constitutes remote code execution from an external source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates multiple downloads of remote artifacts, including the JBang installer script, the
@upstash/context7-mcppackage vianpx, and theio.quarkus:quarkus-agent-mcpartifact viajbang. These resources originate from third-party domains. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various system commands to probe for existing tools (
java,docker,mvn, etc.) and uses agent-specific command-line interfaces (claude mcp,bob mcp,codex mcp) to modify agent configurations and register new MCP servers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface by writing persistent convention files (
CLAUDE.mdorAGENTS.md) into the project root. These files contain mandatory instructions that govern the agent's behavior for all subsequent tasks in the project. - Ingestion points: The skill reads from local templates:
templates/conventions-CLAUDE.mdandtemplates/conventions-AGENTS.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses explicit
<!-- BEGIN ... -->and<!-- END ... -->markers to identify and manage the injected instruction blocks. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network access (
curl), shell execution (bash), package managers (npx,jbang), and file system modification tools (printf,mkdir). - Sanitization: The skill includes instructions to redact sensitive information and avoid handling API keys in plaintext, though it does not detail specific sanitization for the instruction templates themselves.
Audit Metadata