opencli-usage
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the installation of the
@jackwener/opencliNPM package and the cloning of thejackwener/OpenCLIrepository from GitHub to establish the tool's environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides commands for installing third-party plugins directly from any GitHub repository using
opencli plugin install github:user/repo, which allows for the execution of unverified external code within the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
opencli external installcommand to download and configure various external CLI tools (such asgh,docker, andvercel), which typically involves running system-level installation scripts and package managers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to scrape and extract content from arbitrary websites and applications via
opencli browserand specialized site adapters. - Ingestion points: Untrusted content from websites and applications is ingested through browser-driving subcommands such as
extract,find, andnetworkinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to signal the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the extracted web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for significant system interaction through the
Bash(opencli:*)tool, including browser automation, network request interception, and file system access to the~/.opencli/directory. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any filtering or validation processes for the data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata