hunt-agent-deserialization
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides detailed examples of payloads for arbitrary command execution using Python's
subprocess.check_outputandbuiltins.opento demonstrate exploitation of deserialization vulnerabilities. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Includes a 'Runnable Probe' Python script that uses
urllib.requestto send data to external, non-whitelisted domains (https://target/agent/parseandhttp://YOUR_IP:8000/xxe) as part of a security test. It also documents techniques for exfiltrating data via OOB (Out-of-Band) channels like DNS usingnslookup. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Identifies an attack surface where AI agent tools ingest and process untrusted structured data formats (YAML, JSON, XML, etc.) which can be used to inject malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Tools described as
process_config,parse,load,import, andapplyin SKILL.md are identified as entry points for untrusted data. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or security instructions to isolate external data from the execution environment.
- Capability inventory: The skill notes that the agent environment has capabilities for subprocess execution, file system access, and network requests across multiple scripts, which are the primary sinks for the identified vulnerabilities.
- Sanitization: The skill describes the lack of sanitization in common parsers (e.g.,
yaml.loadvssafe_load) as the root cause of the vulnerabilities it targets. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Describes the use of language-specific features (e.g., Python's
!!python/object/apply) and unsafe deserialization methods likepickle.loadsandtorch.loadto execute arbitrary code at runtime. It also references the use of theFicklingtool for behavioral injection in model artifacts.
Audit Metadata