architect-post-call-data
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill sets up extraction prompts and evaluation criteria that process call transcripts, which constitute untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Call transcripts retrieved via
GET /v1/convai/conversations/{cid}as outlined in the design grounding section. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly mandate delimiters for the extraction prompts (config
data_collection), though it notes that LLM extractions run independently for each field. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
PATCHrequests to update agent configurations, controlling how the platform processes conversation data. - Sanitization: While no technical sanitization is described, the skill provides a security-positive instruction to avoid copying transcripts to other logs and to respect zero-retention settings due to PII content.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes interactions with ElevenLabs' official API infrastructure.
- The use of
api.elevenlabs.iofor configuration and transcript retrieval is a standard vendor operation. - Sensitive identifiers like
$API_KEYand$AGENT_IDare treated correctly as placeholders for the user to provide, rather than being hardcoded. - The skill proactively warns against the exfiltration or improper logging of PII found in transcripts.
Audit Metadata