architect-post-call-data

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill sets up extraction prompts and evaluation criteria that process call transcripts, which constitute untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: Call transcripts retrieved via GET /v1/convai/conversations/{cid} as outlined in the design grounding section.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly mandate delimiters for the extraction prompts (config data_collection), though it notes that LLM extractions run independently for each field.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses PATCH requests to update agent configurations, controlling how the platform processes conversation data.
  • Sanitization: While no technical sanitization is described, the skill provides a security-positive instruction to avoid copying transcripts to other logs and to respect zero-retention settings due to PII content.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes interactions with ElevenLabs' official API infrastructure.
  • The use of api.elevenlabs.io for configuration and transcript retrieval is a standard vendor operation.
  • Sensitive identifiers like $API_KEY and $AGENT_ID are treated correctly as placeholders for the user to provide, rather than being hardcoded.
  • The skill proactively warns against the exfiltration or improper logging of PII found in transcripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 08:44 PM