continuous-learning-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill captures and stores all tool inputs, outputs, and session prompts in project-specific log files (
observations.jsonl). While a regex-based secret scrubber is included to redact common credentials like API keys and tokens, the accumulated logs represent a significant repository of sensitive interaction data stored on the local filesystem. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features an indirect prompt injection surface due to its core design: a background process (
observer-loop.sh) automatically feeds recent session observations into an LLM (Claude Haiku) to generate new instructions. Ingestion points: untrusted tool outputs and user prompts stored inobservations.jsonl. Boundary markers: Specific YAML delimiters and rigid formatting instructions in the observer's system prompt. Capability inventory: The observer agent hasReadandWritetool permissions and is invoked via theclaudeCLI; administrative scripts usesubprocess.runand file I/O. Sanitization: Secret scrubbing is implemented, but the content is not sanitized to prevent malicious instructions from influencing the pattern detection logic. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
instinct-cli.pytool includes animportcommand that allows users to fetch instinct files from remote URLs viaurllib.request. While this action is user-initiated, it serves as a vector for importing external, potentially malicious instructions into the agent's knowledge base. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's management scripts and background loops utilize several shell commands (including
git,python,du, andfind) to detect project context, manage process locks, and monitor resource usage. These are used strictly for administrative and contextual purposes.
Audit Metadata