dmux-workflows
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage tmux sessions and git worktrees for parallel agent environments. It executes commands such as
dmux,git worktree add, andnode scripts/orchestrate-worktrees.js. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct users to download and install an external tool
dmuxfromgithub.com/standardagents/dmux. This repository is outside the scope of known trusted providers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references multiple external agent harnesses including
Claude Code,Codex,OpenCode,Cline, andQwenwithout specifying versioning or source verification for the orchestration environment. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local scripts (e.g.,
scripts/orchestrate-worktrees.jsandscripts/lib/tmux-worktree-orchestrator.js) that are referenced but not included in the provided skill files, making their logic unverifiable. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestration helper uses a
plan.jsonfile with alauncherCommandfield (e.g.,codex exec --cwd {worktree_path} --task-file {task_file}). This pattern of string interpolation into shell commands presents a risk of command injection if the input variables are not properly sanitized. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the task-planning data pipeline.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted task descriptions are read from
plan.json(specifically thetaskfield) and passed to sub-agents. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are specified for the task content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary shell commands via the
launcherCommandtemplate and manage multiple terminal panes. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the task strings before they are processed by the orchestration scripts.
Audit Metadata